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Is Your Roommate a Felon? Considering the Effect of
Criminalizing Password Sharing in Nosal II
London Ryynanen England*
In United States v. Nosal (Nosal II), the Ninth Circuit interprets key
terms in the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), delineating actions
considered criminal when taken "without authorization.", The majority opin-
ion creates the unintended consequence of broadly criminalizing the common
and usually innocent practice of password sharing.2 This note compares the
different definitions the majority and dissenting justices assign to the term
"without authorization" within the meaning of the CFAA, specifically 18
U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4). The note suggests expanding the requisite authorization
to include authorization from authorized individuals instead of just authoriza-
tion from system owners. Doing so will narrow the application of the law to
prevent criminalizing innocent password sharing, making the statute worka-
ble for both prosecutors and the public.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE CFAA, NOSAL I, AND NOSAL H
The CFAA was originally enacted in 1984, targeting hackers who ac-
cess "computers to steal information or to disrupt or destroy computer func-
tionality, as well as criminals who possessed the capacity to 'access and
control high technology processes vital to our everyday lives."3 The CFAA
was passed before the Internet was fully publicly accessible, but Congress
still recognized that computer crime posed serious threats to financial and
life-altering technologies.4 Today, the CFAA grants jurisdiction where the
crime involves accessing "protected computers," meaning a computer "ex-
clusively for the use of a financial institution or the United States Govern-
ment . .. or which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or
communication. . .5
* London Ryynanen England is a 2018 candidate for a Juris Doctor from SMU
Dedman School of Law. She received a Bachelor of Arts in Business Adminis-
tration from the University of Washington in 2008. She would like to thank
Brad and Rudolf Ryynanen for their support during law school.
1. See United States v. Nosal, 844 F.3d 1024, 1050 (9th Cir. 2016) [hereinafter
Nosal II].
2. Id. at 1036.
3. LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing
H.R. Rep. 98J894, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3694 (July 24, 1984)).
4. See S. Rep. 99-432, 1-22, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, *2-3 (citing an incident
in 1983 in which an adolescent gang hacked the computer system at Memorial
Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, gaining access to radiation treatment records
and the ability to alter radiation treatment for 6,000 past and present cancer
patients).
5. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(2)(A)-(B).
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In considering the term "without authorization," courts have grappled
with the challenges of employers and online work since the early days of the
law.6 The legislation provides no guidance for what satisfies "authoriza-
tion."7 In United States v. Morris, a Cornell University graduate student
named Morris had "explicit authorization to use computers at Cornell" and to
use the Internet connection between several research universities.8 Morris de-
veloped a "worm" or "virus" to demonstrate the inadequate security of com-
puter networks.9 Morris used his authorized Cornell account to release the
virus at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he held no access cre-
dentials.o The virus crashed computers at universities, military sites, and
medical research facilities.11
Morris was the first case brought under the CFAA, and the Second Cir-
cuit looked to legislative intent to determine whether Morris acted "without
authorization."12 The court found that Congress intended to punish inten-
tional trespasses both by those who are "outsiders" to the organization and
those with some form of "insider" access. 13 Under the Second Circuit's read-
ing of the CFAA, Morris was convicted despite having "insider" access. 14
Recently, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the plain language of the CFAA to
determine congressional intent for the definition of "without authorization."15
The court relied on a dictionary definition for "authorization" as "permission
or power granted by an authority" and held that, "for the purposes of the
CFAA, when an employer authorizes an employee to use a company com-
puter subject to certain limitations, the employee remains authorized to use
the computer even if the employee violates those limitations."16 In other
words, the court wanted to avoid criminalizing misuse of computers by oth-
erwise authorized individuals.
6. See generally Leventhal v. Knapek, 266 F.3d 64, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing
the expectation of privacy by an employee in relation to the contents of an
office computer).
7. "The CFAA defines 'exceeds authorized access,' [the alternate criminal behav-
ior for conviction under the CFAA], as 'access to a computer with authoriza-
tion and using such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that
the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter." Nosal II, supra note 1, at 1033.
8. United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 505-06 (2d Cir. 1991).
9. Id. at 505.
10. Id. at 506-10.
11. Id. at 506.
12. Id. at 509-11.
13. Id. at 511.
14. Morris, 928 F.2d at 511.
15. LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2009).
16. Id. at 1133.
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A. Nosal I
Nosal was a regional director for Korn/Ferry International (KFI), an ex-
ecutive search firm specializing in identifying and recommending candidates
for executive-level corporate positions.17 KFI used a proprietary internal
software program to locate candidates. The software included data on more
than one million executives (including contact information, employment his-
tory, salaries, biographies, and more), culled from a variety of public and
proprietary sources. 18 KFI implemented security measures to protect the con-
fidentiality of the system's information. This included giving each associate a
unique username and password and requiring new associates to sign a confi-
dentiality agreement that specifically prohibited password sharing.19 Also,
when each search was run, the computer program displayed a warning:
"[t]his product is intended to be used by Korn/Ferry employees for work on
Korn/Ferry business only."20
Nosal's employment contract included a non-compete agreement. 21 But
Nosal left KFI to start a competing firm and negotiated his retention with
KFI to finish his open searches subject to continuing his non-competition
agreement. 22 According to Nosal, KFI paid him "a lot of money" to "stay out
of the market."23 Nosal did not stay out of the market.24 Instead, he and three
other KFI employees began a competing firm, Christian & Associates, from
which Nosal earned eighty percent of the revenue. 25 Before leaving KFI, the
Christian & Associates team downloaded information and source lists from
the KFI database.26 These downloads violated KFI's computer use policy.27
In order for Christian & Associates team members to run executive searches
within the KFI database, Nosal's former assistant continued her employment
with KFI and shared her password with the Christian & Associates team. 28
More than a year after Nosal signed his non-compete agreement, an unidenti-
17. Nosal H, 844 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2016).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1031.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1030.
23. Nosal II, 844 F.3d at 1030.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1031.
27. Id. The downloading of KFI proprietary information while Nosal and his asso-
ciates were still employed by KFI became the basis for five of the claims origi-
nally brought under the CFAA and addressed in Nosal I. See United States v.
Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 2012) [hereinafter Nosal I].
28. Nosal II, 844 F.3d at 1031.
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fied person reported the access violations.29 This report resulted in the termi-
nation of all access to Christian & Associates team members.3 0
In Nosal I, the court examined the misuse of log-in credentials during
the time Christian & Associates staff were still partially employed by KFI.31
The court held that the key term "'without authorization' would apply to
outside hackers (individuals who have no authorized access to the computer
at all), and 'exceeds authoriz[ed] access' would apply to inside hackers (indi-
viduals whose initial access to a computer is authorized but who access unau-
thorized information or files)."32 For the five claims addressed in Nosal I,
Nosal's work as an insider, with complete, unlimited access to KFI com-
puters and data, placed him outside the scope of criminal charges under the
CFAA, because the statute was not intended to address mere use violations.33
The court held that despite KFI's internal policy against sharing passwords
and information, because all parties were authorized by KFI to use the com-
puters and the data as part of their employment, their conduct was not "with-
out authorization."34
B. Claims in Nosal II
Initially, Nosal was charged with twenty criminal counts,35 including
eight under the CFAA, two trade secrets counts under the Economic Espio-
nage Act, and one count of conspiracy.36 Five of the eight CFAA claims were
based on use violations by current employees, and were dismissed in Nosal
J.37 The government filed a second superseding indictment with three CFAA
claims, two trade secrets claims, and one conspiracy claim.38 The new CFAA
claims were different from those in Nosal I, because former employees, with
no access whatsoever, took and used a current employee's log-in credentials
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Nosal 1, 676 F.3d at 858.
32. Nosal II, 844 F.3d at 1034.
33. Id.
34. Nosal I, 676 F.3d at 864.
35. This Note does not seek to address the Economic Espionage Act, conspiracy
charges, accomplice liability, or the court's back-and-forth regarding appropri-
ate measures of restitution or attorney's fees. See Nosal II, 844 F.3d at 1031.
Additionally, this note does not address in detail the appropriate language for
jury instructions on "without authorization," instead focusing on the methods
of interpretation. See id. at 1038-39.
36. See Nosal II, 844 F.3d at 1031.
37. Nosal 1, 676 F.3d at 864.
38. Nosal II, 844 F.3d at 1031.
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to run proprietary searches.39 For this, prosecutors charged Nosal with viola-
tions of the CFAA under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(4):
Whoever . . . knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a
protected computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized
access, and by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud
and obtains anything of value unless the object of the fraud and
the thing obtained consists only of the use of the computer and the
value of such is not more than $5,000 in any 1-year period . . .
shall be punished.40
The Federal District Court for the Northern District of California noted
that these grounds were distinct from the claims in Nosal I and fell within the
umbrella of hacking because Nosal attempted to circumvent the clear policy
against use of the database.41 Nosal was convicted on all counts.42 He was
sentenced to one year and one day in prison plus three years of supervised
release, a $60,000 fine, $600 special assessment, and $828,000 in restitution
to KFI.43
H. NOSAL H ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit examined "without authorization," and found that it is
an unambiguous, non-technical term with a plain meaning.44 The majority
claims that "the interpretive fireworks" under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) are re-
served for the second prong, the meaning of "exceeds authorized access," as
was discussed in Nosal I.45 "[T]here has been no division among the circuits
on the straightforward 'without authorization' prong of this section."46 Inter-
estingly, the majority opinion fails to address the stinging dissent on the
meaning of that term. Regarding the implications of Nosal II, this Note ad-
dresses (1) the reasoning behind the majority's interpretation;47 (2) the dis-
sent's interpretation that "[t]his case is about password sharing";48 and (3)
supports the view put forth by the dissent that the majority has criminalized
39. Id. at 1031-32.
40. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(4) (2016).
41. United States v. Nosal, 930 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1060 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
42. Nosal II, 844 F.3d at 1032.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1028.
45. Id. at 1033.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 1033-38.
48. Nosal II, 844 F.3d at 1048-58.
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much of ordinary computer usage by not taking a realistic view of computer
and pasword use.4 9
A. The Majority's Straight-Forward Approach
The majority focused on two Ninth Circuit cases to bind their interpreta-
tion, Brekka and Nosal I, before looking at case law from sister circuits sup-
porting the approach that "without authorization" is "an unambiguous term
that should be given its ordinary meaning."50 In Brekka, the court analyzed
the meanings of "without authorization" and "exceeds authorization" under
§§ 1030(a)(2) and (a)(4).51 "Because the CFAA does not define the term 'au-
thorization,' we look[ ] to the ordinary, contemporaneous meaning of the
term: permission or power granted by an authority."52 In Brekka, as with
Nosal I and II, the court distinguished actions taken by an employee while
employed (and therefore authorized to use a computer) and actions taken
after termination of employment (when acting "without authorization").53
Following this reasoning, these courts held that "the plain language of the
CFAA targets the unauthorized procurement or alternation of information,
not its misuse or misappropriation."54
The majority used "classic statutory interpretation" to consider the plain
and ordinary meaning of the term "without authorization."55 Pulling defini-
tions from Random House Unabridged Dictionary, Black's Law Dictionary,
and the Oxford English Dictionary, the court summarized "authorization" to
mean "permission or power granted by an authority."56 The court found the
use of a plain-language interpretation was clear because "the terms 'author-
ize, 'authorized' or 'authorization' are used without definition over 400 times
in Title 18 of the United States Code," and therefore the term cannot be
ambiguous.57 This means that "someone, including an entity, can grant or
revoke . . . permission.58 Here, that entity was Korn/Ferry, and [Nosal's for-
49. Nosal II was remanded on the issues of attorney's fees and restitution, neither
of which are the subject of this note. See id. at 1048.
50. Id. at 1028.
51. LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2009).
52. Nosal II, 844 F.3d at 1033 (quoting Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1132-36) (internal
punctuation edited for clarity).
53. Brekka, 581 F.3d at 1133.
54. Nosal II, 844 F.3d at 1034 (quoting Nosal 1, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012))
(punctuation edited for clarity).
55. Id. at 1034.
56. Id. at 1035 (quoting RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY
(6th ed. 2001), BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 159 (10th ed. 2014), and OXFORD
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mer secretary whose password was misused by Christian & Associates] did
not have authority to give permission to former employees whose access had
been categorically revoked by the company."59 This supports the court's as-
sessment that the CFAA does not target "insider" misuse of data because
while the defendants used an insider's credentials, they had not been granted
insider authority by KFI.60
The majority points out the consistency of this reasoning by reviewing
interpretations of other appellate courts. The Second Circuit recognized that
"'authorization' is a word 'of common usage, without any technical or am-
biguous meaning.' "61 Consistent with this interpretation, the Fourth Circuit
held that an individual "accesses a computer 'without authorization' when he
gains admission to a computer without approval. Similarly, . . . an employee
'exceeds authorized access' when he has approval to access a computer, but
uses his access to obtain or alter information that falls outside the bounds of
his approved access."62 Likewise, the Sixth Circuit held that "[c]ommonly
understood . . . a defendant who accesses a computer 'without authorization'
does so without sanction or permission."63 In Nosal II, the Ninth Circuit ac-
knowledged "that ill-defined terms may capture arguably innocuous conduct,
such as password sharing among friends and family, inadvertently making
criminals of large groups of people who would have little reason to suspect
they are committing a federal crime," but ultimately found that "without au-
thorization" is an unambiguous term.64
In essence, the majority created a clear and simple rule differentiating
"without access" and "exceeds authorized access," and separating "insider"
actions from crimes by "outsiders."65 Plainly put, the rule from Nosal II is
that an outside actor, without permission from a decision making authority,
acts "without access" when he or she attempts to take or alter information on
a protected computer.66 The court held that the authority must be granted by a
sanctioning power, either an individual or an entity, with proprietary owner-
ship of the computer or data.67
59. Id.
60. See Nosal II, 844 F.3d at 1036.
61. Id. at 1050 (quoting United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 509-11 (2d Cir.
1991)).
62. Id. at 1052 (quoting WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d
199, 204 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted)).
63. Id. (quoting Pulte Homes, Inc. v. Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am., 648 F.3d
295, 303-04 (6th Cir. 2011)).
64. Id. at 1038 (quoting Nosal 1, 676 F.3d 854, 859 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal punc-
tuation omitted)).
65. See id. at 1051-52.
66. See Nosal II, 844 F.3d at 1033-35.
67. Id. at 1037.
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B. The Dissent's Practical Approach
The dissent fundamentally disagrees with the majority's interpretation
in Nosal 1I. While the majority sees this as the work of outside hackers using
fraudulent credentials, the dissent sees this as a case of password sharing
among friends and former co-workers, in violation of an employer use pol-
icy.68 The dissent characterizes the actions of Nosal and his compatriots in
Nosal II as "only slightly different" from the insider actions dismissed in
Nosal I.69 The dissent argues that the majority's holding "jeopariz[es] most
password sharing" by "los[ing] sight of the anti-hacking purpose of the
CFAA, and despite our warning, threatens to criminalize all sorts of innocu-
ous conduct engaged in daily by ordinary citizens."70 The dissent's analysis
rejects the majority's definition of "without authorization," and substituted it
with a definition where authorization to use a computer or data could be
granted by either the system owner or an authorized user.71 The dissent's
definition works to narrow the reach of the statute only to malicious
behavior.
Distilling the facts, the dissent argues that the actions by Christian &
Associates staff to gain access to proprietary KFI search databases was done
by borrowing the password of a present employee who was authorized to
access the database.72 Incongruously,
[i]t would not have been a violation of the CFAA if they had sim-
ply given [the KFI employee] step-by-step directions, which she
then followed. So the question is whether because [Christian:&
Associates] instead used [the employee's] password with her per-
mission, they are criminally liable for access 'without authoriza-
tion' under the Act.73
Unlike the majority, the dissent is not comfortable with this bright-line be-
cause simply failing to receive authorization from the owner of the proprie-
tary information runs the risk of criminalizing large swaths of common
behavior.
Applying that standard, the dissent found that the majority's "broader
reading" of the CFAA results in a world in which "millions of unsuspecting
individuals would find that they are engaging in criminal conduct. . . The
majority does not provide, nor do I see, a workable line which separates the
consensual password sharing in this case from the consensual password shar-
68. See id. at 1053-54.
69. Id. at 1049.
70. Id.
71. See id.
72. Nosal II, 844 F.3d at 1049.
73. Id.
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ing of millions of legitimate account holders[.J"74 Rejecting this result, the
dissent argues that password sharing is not the type of "hacking" that the
CFAA was enacted to penalize.75
As the majority did, the dissent notes that "without authorization" is
used multiple times within the CFAA but is not defined.76 The phrase ap-
pears in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(2)(C) and (a)(4). A key difference between the
majority and the dissent is whether "without authorization" should be read
considering the entire statute, or specifically focused on (a)(4). Subsection
(a)(2)(C) "is the broadest provision of the CFAA" focusing on "intentionally
accessing a computer without authorization or exceeding authorized access,
and thereby obtaining information from any protected computer."77
The dissent argues for a cautious definition of "without authorization"
because it will not only apply to (a)(4) as in Nosal II but also to (a)(2)(C).78
Section 1030(a)(2)(C) lacks the requirement of culpable intent, and broadly
applies to "nearly all desktops, laptops, servers, smart-phones, . . . or any
other Internet-enabled device, even some thermostats qualify as protected."79
So by interpreting "without authorization" to "include[ ] common practices
like password sharing, millions of our citizens would become potential fed-
eral criminals overnight."8o
In a string of examples, the dissent illustrates the error in the majority's
simplistic idea that acting "without authorization" occurs whenever the sys-
tem owner does not consent to the use.8 ' In each example, the dissent shows
how "normal" and "acceptable"- computer usage, like logging onto an ac-
count on behalf of a friend or spouse, should be considered criminal pass-
word sharing unauthorized by the system owner's terms of use.8 2 Drawing a
parallel to the earlier decision in Nosal I, this is exactly the type of behavior
that the court attempted to avoid criminalizing but which ended up criminal-
ized by the majority.83
To solve the over-criminalization problem created by the majority's
broad reading, the dissent suggests that "the best reading of 'without authori-
zation' in the CFAA is one that gives a narrow reach: a person accesses an
74. Id. (quoting Nosal 1, 676 F.3d 854, 859 (9th Cir. 2012)).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1050.
77. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C); also quoting Nosal I, 676 F.3d at 859)
(internal punctuation omitted for clarity).
78. Nosal II, 844 F.3d at 1050 (quoting Nosal 1, 676 F.3d at 861).
79. Id.
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account 'without authorization' if he does so without having the permission
of either the system owner or a legitimate account holder."84 Arguing that
this fits the purposes of the CFAA more clearly (targeting hackers), the dis-
sent posits that "the statute would cover only those whom we would collo-
quially think of as hackers: individuals who steal or guess passwords or
otherwise force their way into computers without the consent of an author-
ized user, not persons who are given the right of access by those who them-
selves possess that right."85 This, the dissent argues, makes particular sense
because of Congress's focus on paralleling hacking with "breaking and
entering."86
Finally, the dissent reasons that the an interpretation of "authorization"
that includes authorization by either the system owner or a legitimate user,
would serve the same purposes and legislative intent as the definition
adopted by the majority while also working within the framework of judicial
lenity.87 Finding that the majority's decision creates ambiguity over who may
grant authorization, the rule of lenity encourages adoption of the construction
that prevents the criminalization of innocent behavior.88 Therefore, the dis-
sent argues for the narrower reading under the rule of lenity so that individual
citizens will be on notice about which computer-related behaviors are poten-
tially criminal.89 The dissent examines behavior in which a friend or family
member shares a password and "would most certainly believe-and with
good reason-that his access had been 'authorized' by the account holder"
but which would be criminal under the majority's position.90 Under the ma-
jority rule, this sort of innocent behavior is not distinguished from Nosal's
"unscrupulous" behavior, making both equally criminal.91 Therefore, the dis-
sent reasons, the "natural interpretation" of most computer users conflicts
with the common-sense definition that the majority puts forth, and "[t]hat
alone should defeat the majority's conclusion."92
Further, the dissent finds that the majority's position "would base crimi-
nal liability on system owners' access policies," an approach previously re-
jected in Nosal I because they are "lengthy, opaque, subject to change and
84. Nosal H, 844 F.3d at 1051.
85. Id.
86. Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. 98-894, 20, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3706).
87. Id. at 1053.
88. Id. (citing EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 582 n.10
(1st Cir. 2001), which "concluded that the meaning of the term 'without author-
ization' in the CFAA 'has proven to be elusive"').
89. Id.
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seldom read."93 The dissent points out why this is problematic: private com-
panies would essentially be capable of criminalizing access violations by re-
fusing to authorize end users and writing access policies clearly forbidding
password sharing.94
The "rule [of lenity] ensures that the clear (and public) words of Con-
gress-not the obscure policies of system owners-delimit their scope." 9 5
Therefore, the dissent argues that "the majority opinion contains no limiting
principle," because, while "the majority disavows the effects of its decision
aside from dealing with former employees ... the statute says nothing about
employment," and may result in selective or arbitrary enforcement.96 Even if
the opinion only applied in employment cases, the dissent points out situa-
tions where password sharing between current and former employers may
actually benefit the employer.97 This inconsistency "is a recipe for giving
large corporations undue power over their rivals, their employees, and ordi-
nary citizens, as well as affording such indiscriminate power to the Justice
Department."98 The dissent points out, for example, that in Nosal II, a former
employee with millions of dollars on the line was investigated by KFI with
the help of ex-FBI agents while considering both the criminal and civil pen-
alties under the CFAA and other laws.99 Stopping short of accusing the em-
ployer of wrongdoing, the dissent shows that this interpretation of "without
authorization," in unscrupulous and well-funded hands, could lead to im-
proper prosecutorial motives and misapplication of the CFAA towards indi-
viduals most would not consider "hackers."oo
C. Examining the Nosal II Implications in Modern Computing
The dissent presents a compelling argument that the majority's rule-
that only the system owner may grant "authorization"-over-criminalizes
common computer use and password sharing. Without going so far as to
93. Id. (quoting Nosal I, 676 F.3d 854, 860 (9th Cir. 2012)).
94. Id.
95. Id. It is worth noting here, that the dissent seems to imply that this concern
would be minimized were the CFAA a purely civil statute, but because it is
criminal it is particularly egregious.
96. Nosal II, 844 F.3d at 1055.
97. Id. at 1055-56. For example, consider a current employee calling a former
employee for help accessing a rarely used file that the former employee re-
members only roughly where to find it. Rather than spending a long time on the
phone trying to help the current employee navigate the system, the former em-
ployee might use the current employee's login credentials to find the file and
help the company.
98. Id. at 1056.
99. Id. at 1056-57.
100. See id. at 1057.
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advocate for a complete rewrite of the CFAA, the definition of "without au-
thorization" should be carefully examined because it inadvertently criminal-
izes a lot of perfectly "normal" computer activity. Defining "authorization"
to mean that an end user may be authorized by either the system owner or an
authorized user produces a narrow reading of the statute that avoids over-
criminalizing.101 This definition protects common use in the criminal context.
1. Almost All Americans Share Passwords for Systems They Do
Not "Own"
The majority and dissent fundamentally disagree over whether this is a
mere password sharing case.1 02 However, on simplest version of the facts,
Nosal and his partners at Christian & Associates borrowed an active, author-
ized KFI password and misused an existing employee's account in violation
the KFI terms of use.1 03 Computer users nationwide click rapidly past end-
user license agreements and share passwords regularly, but the average
American does not intend to commit a federal crime in doing so. The rule of
lenity should protect citizens where the law clearly criminalizes common-
place behavior.
The dissent considers situations where an individual inadvertently
breaks the law.104 For example, consider a situation where an individual who
is authorized to use a Netflix account, shares his or her log-in credentials
with non-paying members. Or, a situation where a law student holds author-
ized student log-in credentials with LexisNexis or Westlaw, which allow un-
limited free searches, and shares those log-in credentials with a friend who
practices at a small firm on a pay-as-you-go plan. On their face, both of these
maneuvers are unscrupulous and clearly designed to short the companies of
revenue and skirt their end user license agreements. However, it is unlikely
that either the Netflix user or law student would believe their behavior was
criminal. In fact, a 2015 study revealed that prior to Netflix's new "multiple
accounts" policy, two-thirds of all users shared their accounts with others,
which violated the Netflix policy.105 Those users may have believed that Net-
flix could cancel their account, charge them a fee, or potentially sue them.
These users would be shocked to discover their case paralleled with Nosal
II's $828,000 restitution and jail time.106 These examples are more inten-
tional and include a small degree of moral objection that many of the dis-
101. See id at 1051.
102. Nosal II, 844 F.3d at 1048.
103. See id at 1030-31.
104. Id. at 1051.
105. Devin Coldewey, Sharing Netflix Account with Friends? You're not the Only
One, NBC NEWS (Oct. 28, 2016, 3:03 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/in
ternet/two-thirds-netflix-users-share-access-others-n39667 1.
106. Nosal II, 844 F.3d at 1032. The restitution award was vacated in the amended
opinion. Id. at 1048.
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sent's examples lacked (like a wife accessing a husband's bank account at his
requestl07), but do not facially appear criminal in nature.
2. Criminal Culpability under the CFAA Should Only Apply to
Hackers
The definition of "without authorization" should allow either a system
owner or an authorized user to grant permission for use. Not all sections of
the CFAA require criminal culpability; therefore, a broad application risks
capturing innocent conduct, contrary to congressional intent for the CFAA to
target hackers.108 For 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C), no criminal culpability is
required.109 While the majority attempts to draw bright lines, or narrow its
holding to employment cases, the definition it supported for "without author-,
ization" will apply equally to §§ (a)(2)(C) and (a)(4).IIO But § (a)(4) requires
"knowingly or with intent to defraud," while § (a)(2)(C) requires no culpable
intent.' II Therefore, anyone who "accesses a computer without authorization
[from the system owner], and thereby obtains ... information from any pro-
tected computer . . . shall be punished."112 Regardless of the application-of
"without authorization" to § (a)(4), this term will be applied equally through-
out the CFAA and creates a situation where the law is no longer targeting
hackers but general misuse. The interpretation runs completely contrary to
the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Nosal I.113
Nationwide, courts have identified a conflict between the plain-language
of the CFAA and the intent by Congress to target hackers, which will take
more than a small definitional change to revise.114 But weighing easy fixes to
107. Id. at 1055.
108. See id. at 1051.
109. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C).
110. Nosal II, 844 F.3d at 1050.
111. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4), with 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C).
112. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C).
113. See Nosal 1, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012).
114. See iPhone Application Litig., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106865, at *36-37 (cit-
ing Bose v. Interclick, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 9183 (DAB), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
93663, at *12-14 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2011)) (the court dismissed the com-
plaint but recognized tension between individual use-violations, end-user li-
cense agreements, the challenge to determine damages, and more); see also
United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1265 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming
the conviction of a Social Security Administration teleservices agent who ac-
cessed the SSA database to obtain information about women in whom he was
romantically interested, and then pursued those women through disquieting
phone calls or unannounced home visits); United States v. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp.
2d 367, 373-75 (D. Conn. 2001) (denying a motion to dismiss filed by the
defendant, a Russian hacker, who allegedly violated the CFAA by stealing net-
work passwords and attempting to extort money from the company in exchange
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limit the scope of this law to behavior that is truly intended to circumvent
policies (i.e., actual "hacking"), adopting a definition for "without authoriza-
tion" that results in a narrow reach would protect all well-intentioned Netflix
password sharers from criminal liability.
M. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit clarified the CFAA by defining "without authoriza-
tion," explaining that it is the grant of permission by a system owner.115 The
dissent argued that this definition criminalized common and innocent com-
puter usage.11 6 This definitional debate hinged on whether the party viewed
Nosal and his compatriots as "hackers," or whether this was merely a case of
password sharing.117 Looking forward, the dissent provided an alternative
definition for "without authorization," wherein a system owner or an author-
ized user could grant permission for computer-use.i"8 Because not all crimes
under the CFAA require criminal culpability, the majority's broad definition
risks trapping people criminally who acted without criminal intent. There-
fore, because the rule of lenity encourages interpreting statutes to provide
citizens with notice of criminal acts, I advocate for a wide-spread adoption of
the dissent's definition of "without authorization" that results in an appropri-
ately narrow reach of the statute.
for making their network secure again); see also Andrew T. Hemacki, A Vague
Law in a Smartphone World: Limiting the Scope of Unauthorized Access
Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 61 AM. U.L. REv. 1543, 1562-64
(2012) (citing the above cases to illustrate the problems with the present incar-
nation of the CFAA and offering proposed amendments to bring it back in line
with the mission of targeting hackers).
115. Nosal II, 844 F.3d at 1035.
116. See id. at 1053-54.
117. See id.
118. Id.
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